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Abstract— We consider a quantity-setting duopoly
model, and we study the decision to move ﬁrst or
second, by assuming that the ﬁrms produce homo-
geneous goods and that there is some demand uncer-
tainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods,
and in either period, the ﬁrms can make a production
decision that is irreversible. As far as the ﬁrms are
allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they
make the decision, we study the circumstances that
favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.
Keywords: Industrial Organization, Game Theory,
Cournot model, uncertainty
1 Introduction
In a standard duopoly, ﬁrms choose either prices or quan-
tities in a non-cooperative fashion. If the decisions are
made simultaneously, these models are called, respec-
tively, Bertrand model and Cournot model (see [2, 3]).
Sometimes, one of the ﬁrm has the opportunity to make
his decision before the other ﬁrm. In a quantity set-
ting, the situation is called Stackelberg model (see [17]).
Stackelberg leader-follower relations have most often been
modeled in association with the chronological order of
moves. Namely, there are a ﬁrst mover (leader) and a
second mover (follower). In spite of such a supposedly
dynamic setting, it has been common to overlook what
happens during the period between these two moves, by
assuming a static market which clears only once, after the
second mover’s move. This builds certain biases into the
analysis of ﬁrms’ strategic incentives either to lead or to
follow, which are the contributing forces to endogenous
Stackelberg outcomes.
In the earlier literature, endogenous leader/follower has
been imbedded most often in the context of a timing
game played by oligopolists. Hamilton and Slutsky [7]
construct an ‘extended game’ framework, in which each
ﬁrm faces the choice of production timing. A fair number
of theoretical explanations have been attempted with re-
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gard to ﬁrms’ incentives for Stackelberg behaviour, espe-
cially a follower’s incentive to wait. Robson [14] imposes
costs associated with an early action. Albaek [1] takes
into account cost uncertainty. The eﬀect of a priori in-
formational heterogeneity between ﬁrms, broadly deﬁned,
have been discussed in several studies, including Mailath
[12] and Normann [13]. On the other hand, when the
oligopolists are a priori equally uncertain about the mar-
ket demand, as in Maggi [11], Sadanand and Sadanand
[15] and Spencer and Brander [16], earlier production
can utilize less information in exchange for the strate-
gic advantage of commitment, whereas later production
does the converse. Hirokawa and Sasaki [8] employed a
similar framework to Hamilton and Slutsky’s ‘extended
game’, except that the static market is replaced with an
explicitly two-period market. Lagerlo¨f [10] shows that if
the distribution of the demand uncertainty has a mono-
tone hazard rate and if another, rather weak, assumption
is satisﬁed, then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed.
Ferreira et al. [4] study the eﬀects of demand uncertainty
in a Stackelberg duopoly.
In this paper, we follow closely the paper of Kultti and
Niinima¨ki [9], by considering a more general demand
function. We assume that the competitive phase consists
of two periods. In either period, the ﬁrms can make a pro-
duction decision that is irreversible. As far as the ﬁrms
are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they
make the decision, one can study the circumstances that
favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions. If
this is the only change in the standard setting with perfect
information there are now three pure strategy subgame
perfect equilibria when the ﬁrms are symmetric (see [7]).
Either of the ﬁrm is a leader and the other one a fol-
lower, or both of them make the same choices as in the
standard setting in the ﬁrst period. The ﬁrms prefer the
equilibrium in which they move ﬁrst. Even though no
equilibrium selection is helpful here the symmetry of the
situation makes the symmetric equilibrium appealing.
In our work the production period plays a non-trivial
role since we assume that the demand is uncertain, and
that the uncertainty is resolved once either ﬁrm makes
its production decision. The enterprise bears a close re-
lationship to the literature about endogenous timing of
moves in oligopolies (see [1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13]). Hamilton and
Slutsky [7] study two diﬀerent games: A game in which
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ﬁrms announce in which period they are going to produce,
and are committed to this announcement, and a game in
which the ﬁrms can choose in which period to produce
only by actually producing. Our model corresponds to
the second game, the diﬀerence being uncertainty about
demand and diﬀerentiated goods. In our model, simulta-
neous moves is never an equilibrium, and depending on
the variance of the demand, either the ﬁrst mover or the
second mover may be more proﬁtable.
The crucial assumption in our model is the way demand
is revealed. If either ﬁrm produces in the ﬁrst period, de-
mand is known in the second period. In case neither ﬁrm
produces in the ﬁrst period, demand remains unknown
in the second period. This is clearly a very speciﬁc as-
sumption that applies only to some markets. Perhaps,
the most important is the case of new products. Demand
for new products is highly uncertain, and many times the
only way to ﬁnd it is to enter the markets by producing
the product. By the assumption made, the demand is
revealed since some products are sold in the ﬁrst period,
and then we can ask why the ﬁrm cannot produce more
in the second period if demand turns out to be strong.
The answer is the same as in the standard Stackelberg
model: it is assumed that the ﬁrms are committed to the
levels of production which they choose. The standard
static case is an approximation of a dynamic real life sit-
uation that is compressed into two stages. Our model
can be regarded as an approximation of a real life situ-
ation in which a producer brings a new product to the
market. First, he has to expend his time in production,
and only after this he sells the product which is time
consuming as well. The competitor produces while the
ﬁrst producer sells his products. This model allows us to
analyse the trade-oﬀ between producing early, and being
well informed about demand.
2 The model
There are two ﬁrms and two time periods. Both ﬁrms
produce a diﬀerentiated good. The demand, for simplic-
ity, is linear, namely
p = α− β(q1 + q2),
with α > 0 and β ≥ 1, where p is the price and qi the
amount produced of good i, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Firms have the
same constant marginal cost c. We consider that the de-
mand intercept is a random variable which is assumed to
have a continuous density. The density of α is, however,
common knowledge. The expected value of α is E(α).
We assume that the variance V (α) of α is not too large
in a sense that in no case the ﬁrms produce so much that
price drops to zero.
Our aim is to study the eﬀect of information revelation
on the timing of the ﬁrms’ production decisions. To this
end we model the ﬁrms playing the following extensive
game. The ﬁrms make their decisions non-cooperatively,
and they may choose the quantity to be produced in ei-
ther period. If a ﬁrm produces already in period 1 the
choice is common knowledge in period 2, and the true
demand is revealed. If neither ﬁrm produces in the ﬁrst
period no information about demand is revealed in the
second period. Notice that the game is not a signalling
game, and that unlike in many models only actions speak;
ﬁrms commit to a production decision by producing, not
making announcements about when they intend to pro-
duce and how much (see [1, 7]). Next we determine the
proﬁts when the ﬁrms move sequentially and simultane-
ously, and then we compare the proﬁts in the two cases.
2.1 Sequential decisions
Without loss of generality, let ﬁrm 1 be the ﬁrst mover
and make its decision in the ﬁrst period. Firm 2 is the
follower which delays its production decisions until the
second period. Firm 1 believes (correctly) that its pro-
duction decision in period 1 will inﬂuence ﬁrm 2’s deci-
sion a period later. That is, the follower will select q2 to
maximize its proﬁt
π2 = (α− βq1 − βq2(α)− c)q2(α).
Thus,
q2(α) =
α− βq1 − c
2β
. (1)
First mover’s decision problem is to maximize his ex-
pected proﬁt
E(π1) = E((α− βq1 − βq2 − c)q1)
=
E(α)− βq1 − c
2
q1.
Thus,
q1 =
E(α)− c
2β
. (2)
Using equation (2), the follower’s choice (1) can be rewrit-
ten
q2(α) =
2α− E(α)− c
4β
,
and the equilibrium price turns out
p(α) =
2α− E(α) + 3c
4
.
First mover’s expected proﬁt is
E(π1) =
(E(α)− c)2
8β
, (3)
while the follower’s expected proﬁt is
E(π2) =
(E(α)− c)2
16β
+
V (α)
4
. (4)
First mover has an advantage, if
(E(α)− c)2
8β
>
(E(α)− c)2
16β
+
V (α)
4
,
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which is equivalent to
(E(α)− c)2 > 4V (α). (5)
If the variance in α is small, the usual Stackelberg case
where the ﬁrst mover has always an advantage prevails.
Only if the variance is large, the ﬁrst mover may fare
worse than the second mover. Note that the ﬁrst mover’s
proﬁt does not depend upon the variance. This comes
from the linear demand and the fact that the variance is
assumed small enough so that realized prices are always
positive. The second mover’s proﬁt depends upon the
variance since variance indicates the pay-oﬀ from waiting
as the second mover knows the realized demand.
So, we have proved the following result.
Theorem 1. The second mover earns higher proﬁts than
the ﬁrst mover, if the variance is large enough (i.e., if
V (α) > (E(α)− c)2/4). Otherwise, the ﬁrst mover earns
higher proﬁts.
2.2 Simultaneous decisions
As long as both ﬁrms make their production decisions
simultaneously the proﬁts are the same regardless of the
period, since the assumptions about the revelation of in-
formation guarantee that the demand is unknown. Firm
1 maximizes its expected proﬁt
E(π1) = E((α− β(q1 + q2)− c)q1).
Thus,
q1 =
E(α)− βq2 − c
2β
.
Similarly, we get
q2 =
E(α)− βq1 − c
2β
.
Thus, in equilibrium, output decisions are given by
q1 = q2 =
E(α)− c
3β
,
and the price given by
p(α) =
3α− 2E(α) + 2c
3
.
So, the expected proﬁts of both ﬁrms are equal, given by
E(π1) = E(π2) =
(E(α)− c)2
9β
. (6)
It is easy to establish that, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms do
not produce in the ﬁrst period; a revealed preference ar-
gument is suﬃcient to establish this. Assume that there
is an equilibrium in which both ﬁrms produce in the ﬁrst
period. Denote the ﬁrms’ equilibrium outputs by q∗1 and
q∗2 . Consider, say, ﬁrm 1. Suppose that it deviates and
waits until the next period when it gets to know the real-
ized demand. It can still produce q∗1 , but with full knowl-
edge of the demand this output level is not the optimal
choice. Firm 2 produces (E(α)−c)/(3β) and the upcom-
ing production of deviating ﬁrm 1 will be
3α− E(α)− 2c
6β
.
Thus, the expected proﬁt is
(E(α)− c)2
9β
+
V (α)
4β
,
which is V (α)/(4β) higher than if the ﬁrm would not
deviate. This shows that there is no equilibrium with
both ﬁrms producing in the ﬁrst period. Thus, there
are three possible equilibria: (i) Firm 1 produces in the
ﬁrst period and ﬁrm 2 in the second period; (ii) Firm 2
produces in the ﬁrst period and ﬁrm 1 in the second; and
(iii) both ﬁrms produce in the second period.
Next, we compare the proﬁts in the sequential and si-
multaneous moves cases to determine whether or when
sequential moves are more proﬁtable than simultaneous
moves. Whenever the ﬁrst mover’s expected proﬁt is
larger than his expected proﬁt in the simultaneous move
case, simultaneous moves is not an equilibrium. But,
from equations (3) and (6), we see that this is always the
case. We must still show that ﬁrm 2 does not deviate
and produce in the ﬁrst period, when ﬁrm 1 is already
producing
E(α)− c
2β
in the ﬁrst period. Firm 2’s optimal output choice in the
ﬁrst period is
E(α)− c
4β
.
Thus, ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁt is
(E(α)− c)2
16β
,
V (α)/(4β) less than if the ﬁrm waited to the next period.
Thus, ﬁrm 2 does not deviate and there does not exist an
equilibrium in which the ﬁrms move simultaneously.
Now, we are going to compare the expected proﬁts of
the two moving alternatives. Firm F2 prefers sequential
solution to simultaneous moves, if (4) is larger than (6),
which is equivalent to
36V (α) > 7(E(α)− c)2. (7)
Combining conditions (5) and (7), we get that
7(E(α)− c)2/9 < 4V (α) < (E(α)− c)2, (8)
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and we can say that if condition (8) holds the ﬁrst mover
earns more than the follower and both ﬁrms prefer se-
quential moves to simultaneous moves.
So, we have proved the following result.
Theorem 2. The game presented in this paper has ex-
actly two equilibria in both of which the ﬁrms move se-
quentially.
This result implies that, in cases where demand uncer-
tainty is revealed only after at least one ﬁrm produces,
there are no simultaneous equilibria. The case in which
both ﬁrms move simultaneously in the ﬁrst period is not
an equilibrium, since either ﬁrm can wait till the next pe-
riod when it has the same choice set as in the ﬁrst period,
and additionally it knows the realized demand. The case
in which both ﬁrms move simultaneously in the second
period is not an equilibrium roughly because a deviating
ﬁrm gains a ﬁrst mover advantage. Generally, this is an
advantage only with respect to the simultaneous moves
case since it is possible that the second mover’s proﬁts
are greater than the ﬁrst mover’s proﬁts.
3 Conclusions
We have shown that in cases where demand uncertainty
is revealed only after at least one ﬁrm produces, there are
no simultaneous equilibria in a quantity-setting duopoly.
We also proved that the second mover earns higher proﬁts
than the ﬁrst mover, if the uncertainty is high; Otherwise,
the ﬁrst mover earns higher proﬁts.
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